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Executive summary 
This study provides a quantitative analysis of the potential medium-run impacts of two Brexit 
scenarios on the Danish food and agricultural sectors. In the WTO scenario, the UK and EU are 
assumed to treat each other on WTO MFN terms, implying rising bilateral tariffs to the MFN levels 
of the EU and also rising non-tariff barriers; whereas in the FTA scenario, a normal free trade area 
between the two sides are assumed, implying zero tariff but still rising NTBs. The UK is further 
assumed to exit preferential trade agreements negotiated by the EU with third countries in both 
scenarios, implying rising trade costs between the UK and these third countries.  
The expected medium-run impacts of the two scenarios are evaluated in a common baseline in a 
computable general equilibrium model. The baseline is constructed by projecting the world economy 
to 2021, a year when the Brexit scenarios are assumed to be in effect. In the baseline, current 
macroeconomic projections towards 2021 are targeted while current trade policies including the 
membership of the UK in the EU common market are maintained. Additionally, a few important 
preferential trade agreements currently negotiated or considered by the EU are also assumed in the 
baseline. Simulation results suggest that bilateral exports from Denmark to the UK would shrink 
significantly under the WTO scenario, particularly for key export products such as processed foods, 
pork products, and dairy. Total Danish food and agricultural exports to the UK would fall by as much 
as 79 percent under the WTO scenario and by about 48 percent under the FTA scenario. In addition 
to the expected rise in tariff barriers, the assumed large increases in non-tariff barriers in the two 
scenarios are also key driver behind these results. However, reductions of total Danish agri-food 
exports would be quite limited in both scenarios, due to the possibilities for Danish exports to be 
redirected within the EU and to countries that are partners to the various preferential trade agreements 
of the EU and due to the fact that exports to UK are only a fraction of total Danish exports. While 
total Danish exports are expected to drop slightly, prices of Danish exports would also be dampened 
but only to even smaller extent. Reductions in domestic production of key export products would be 
quite small as well. For processed foods, pork, and dairy, domestic outputs would be 2.5, 2.2, and 1.1 
percent lower than the baseline levels in the WTO scenario. In connections with changes in domestic 
outputs, Danish processed food, pork and dairy sectors’ labor employment would shrink by 1.1-2.6 
percent under the WTO scenario and 0.2-1.5 percent under the FTA scenario.  
At the macro level, nominal GDP for both Denmark and the UK are expected to decrease relative to 
the baseline; however, losses to Danish GDP are expected to be much smaller at about 0.64 percent 
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under the WTO scenario and at 0.44 under the FTA scenario, as compared to the 4.8 and 3.4 percent 
losses for the UK under the two scenarios respectively. Expected decreases in real GDP in the two 
countries are much smaller in both scenarios. These relative differences in GDP losses are indications 
of the asymmetric nature of the trade policy changes associated with the assumed Brexit scenarios as 
the extent of rising trade barriers facing UK exports are far greater than those facing Danish exports. 
Moreover, the EU single market and preferential accesses to the market of EU’s FTA partner 
countries provide ample flexibilities to redirect trade flows for remaining EU member states such as 
Denmark.  
Based on these simulation results, this study suggests that the overall negative results arising from 
rising trade costs due to Brexit are more pronounced for the UK. For Denmark, while bilateral exports 
for key exportable sectors may be hit hard, overall Danish exports would be impacted relatively little. 
Between the two scenarios considered, an FTA with the UK would enable both sides to avoid larger 
losses to trade flows, domestic outputs, and employment. To create more flexibilities to fully 
compensate the anticipated lost trade flows to the UK market, one option for the EU including 
Denmark is to pursue further trade liberalization at multilateral and bilateral levels.   
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1 Introduction 
The economic consequences of Brexit are a contested issue that continues to spur debate. Apart from 
the inherent uncertainty generated by such a big change in international relations, the details of the 
divorce settlement between the UK and the EU have important implications for the post-Brexit 
trading relations and economic conditions for both the UK and the EU. Furthermore, the UK’s future 
trading agreements with third countries can impact the UK, the EU as well as individual EU member 
countries differently, depending upon e.g. specific stipulations for various commodities. 
In this report we evaluate the impacts of Brexit1. In light of the uncertainty regarding the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU27, we limit our analytical attention to two possibilities: a 
future Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between EU27 and the UK (“optimistic” scenario) and a scenario 
where the UK and EU27 trade with each other on WTO’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) terms 
(“pessimistic” scenario). Each of these scenarios is evaluated against a benchmark or “baseline” 
where the UK is assumed to remain in the European Union. 
Our modeling approach is fairly standard in that we use a global Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model2 to assess the impacts of Brexit. In our “optimistic” scenario where the UK enters into 
an FTA with EU27 we find a nominal GDP impact of -0.4 percent for Denmark and -3.4 percent for 
the UK. In the “pessimistic” scenario, where the UK and EU27 trade on MFN (rather than 
preferential) terms, the Danish and UK GDP impacts become -0.6 and -4.8 percent, respectively. 
Changes in real GDP in the two Brexit scenarios are smaller than changes in nominal GDP in both 
countries, but the relative magnitudes of real GDP changes between Denmark and UK remain the 
same. Our results therefore indicate that the Danish economy will be affected by Brexit but the impact 
on the UK economy is one order of magnitude higher. Moreover, as expected, the WTO MFN 
scenario leads to more negative impacts than the FTA scenario for both the UK and for Denmark. 
These findings are also broadly in line with the literature. Emerson et al. (2017), for example, report 
                                                            
1 This report is the result of a project commissioned by the Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark (MFVM) on 
the potential impact of BREXIT on Danish agriculture sectors. Per Svejstrup Hansen from the Department of Food and 
Resource Economics and the University of Copenhagen has acted as internal reviewer for this report and provided 
useful comments, for which the authors are grateful. 
2 We use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. 
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an average estimated UK GDP impact of -1.3 and -4.2 across all the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” 
scenarios in the various published Brexit studies listed in Table 1 below.3 
In this report the “optimistic” scenarios are those which lead to a small increase in trade barriers 
whereas “pessimistic” scenarios are those which lead to larger trade costs increases.4 For example, 
the “optimistic” scenario in Dhingra et al. (2016) refers to a situation where the UK remains in the 
European single market and has a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with EU27 (similar to Norway). In 
their “pessimistic” scenario, on the other hand, the authors assume that the UK and EU27 cannot 
agree on an FTA and the two subsequently trade on MFN terms. This is also how the “pessimistic” 
scenario is defined in the other studies listed in Table 1. The “optimistic” scenarios in the other studies 
in Table 1 all refer to an FTA between the UK and EU27 and, in some cases, the UK staying in the 
single market. 
Table 1. Estimated long term (2030) GDP impacts from BREXIT 
Study Scenario UK impact EU27 impact 
  (% change in GDP relative to baseline) 
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) Optimistic -2.7 - 
 Central -5.1 - 
 Pessimistic -7.7 -0.8 
    
Dhingra et al. (2016) Optimistic -1.3 -0.1 
 Pessimistic -2.6 -0.3 
    
Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) Optimistic -0.6 -0.1 
 Pessimistic -2.3 -0.3 
    
Rojas-Romagosa (2016) Optimistic -3.4 -0.6 
 Pessimistic -4.1 -0.8 
    
Booth et al. (2015)  Optimistic +1.5 - 
 Mid-range 1 +0.6 - 
 Mid-range 2 -0.8 - 
 Pessimistic -2.2 -0.3 
    
Treasury (2016) Optimistic -3.8 - 
 Central -6.2 - 
 Pessimistic -7.5 - 
    
Average Optimistic -1.3 -0.1 
                                                            
3 Differences in methods, model assumptions, scenarios and base years are the main reasons that results differ across 
studies. For instance, as will be discussed below, the current study assumes a baseline of 2021 whereas studies surveyed 
in Table 1 refer to a baseline of 2030.  
4 “Optimistic” and “pessimistic” scenarios are also sometimes referred to as a “soft” or a “hard” Brexit, respectively. 
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 Pessimistic -4.2 -0.5 
Note: The EU27 impact in Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) refers to the medium term defined as year 
2023. Source: Adapted from Emerson et al. (2017). 
In order to implement these scenarios in a quantitative model, one has to make specific assumptions 
about the changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the speed at which trade costs change 
following Brexit. Dhingra et al. (2016), for example, assume that NTBs increase in both scenarios 
but the increase in NTB trade costs in the “optimistic” scenario is only one third of the increase in the 
“pessimistic” scenario. Moreover, in the “optimistic” scenario it is assumed that intra EU27 trade 
costs fall 20 percent faster than in the rest of the world, while in the “pessimistic” scenario they fall 
40 percent faster, as had been the case historically (see Méjean and Schwellnus, 2009). Although it 
is not always stated clearly, any quantitative trade analysis necessarily involves a large number of 
such choices and compromises. We will elaborate on the details of how we implement our own 
scenarios as well as how we define the baseline in section 3. 
As mentioned above, the Brexit impacts that we calculate in this report is based on a CGE model. 
Two of the studies listed in  
Table 1, namely Booth et al. (2015) and Rojas-Romagosa (2016), are also based on CGE model 
simulations. The main advantage of a CGE model in general and the GTAP model in particular, is its 
level of details. A CGE model is a stylized internally consistent representation of an entire economy, 
made up of a number of sectors. This means that a shock to the price of a good in a given sector (e.g. 
through changes to a tariff), for example, not only affects input demand and output supply in that 
specific sector, it has ripple effects on all sectors of the economy as the economy moves towards a 
new equilibrium. GTAP simulations thus provide very comprehensive and detailed impacts of policy 
changes, including changes to global production patterns, trade flows, employment, wages etc., at a 
sectoral as well as the aggregate level. The complexity of a CGE model is probably also its main 
potential weakness. For example, the large number of behavioral parameters in the model means that 
it is very difficult to evaluate how robust the results are to changes in assumption about relationships 
between the variables in the model. Moreover, these parameter values are often not founded on 
rigorous up-to-date empirical analysis as the exercises to calibrate models to new parameters are often 
quite time-consuming. However, recent advances in parameter estimation and validations in CGE 
models such as GTAP have led to increased confidence in modeling results and resulted in these 
models’ popularities in trade policy analysis. 
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There are two main alternatives to CGE modelling of trade policy impacts. These are both based on 
an econometric model where (some of the) key parameters are estimated prior to any impact 
calculations. The first alternative is a micro based approach knows as the gravity model, which 
quantifies the determinants of bilateral trade flows. These determinants can be grouped into three 
main categories namely measures of economic size, geographic distance, and other factors affecting 
trade costs such as common language, FTAs, etc. Estimates from a gravity model can be used to 
predict the trade impact of a change in trade policy but they do not reflect welfare impacts or changes 
in macro variable such as GDP or employment. Gravity estimates can, however, serve as inputs into 
so called New Quantitative Trade (NQT) models. A NQT model is also a type of general equilibrium 
model but with a much simpler structure than a CGE model. These can be used to calculate sectoral 
and aggregate welfare impacts but not impacts on employment, wages and other economic variables 
that are often of interest for policy makers. A main benefit of NQT models over CGE models is that 
they are less complex, easier to comprehend and the data requirements are much less demanding. 
Another advantage is that the key parameters are estimated prior to the impact calculations so there 
is a stronger correspondence between the data and the results than in a CGE model. Among the studies 
listed in Table 1, Dhingra et al. (2016) and Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) are based on a NQT model. 
The second alternative to CGE models is a global macroeconometric model á la NiGEM.5 Unlike 
CGE and gravity models that are both usually static, macroeconometric models are dynamic and 
agents are forward looking. Key macroeconomic variables such as GDP, import and export are 
determined within the model and can easily be forecasted. CGE models, on the other hand, allow for 
a much more detailed analysis of the sectoral impacts and for a more thorough analysis of various 
policy options. As for the NQT models, parameters are estimated prior to impact evaluation step but 
a macroeconometric model allows for a forecast of the entire time path towards any given future date, 
including the uncertainty involved, rather than a comparative static analysis of two situations where 
the time dimension does not feature explicitly. The studies by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) and 
Treasury (2016) are both (partly) based on the NiGEM model. 
Unlike the studies mentioned above, our focus in this report is on the agri-food sector impacts, namely 
the agri-food sector in Denmark. Another novelty is that we analyze carefully the effects related to 
some of EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with third countries. For example, the EU has 
a PTA with Korea, Norway, Turkey and many other countries. Moreover, EU has reached an 
                                                            
5 NiGEM stands for (the) National Institute Global Econometric Model. 
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agreement with Canada (CETA) and there are ongoing or prospective negotiations with Japan, Brazil 
(as part of the negotiations with MERCOSUR), USA, Australia and New Zealand among others.6 We 
evaluate how the impact of Brexit on the Danish economy in general and the agri-food sector in 
particular, depends on the successful completion of these trade agreements. We assume that the UK 
will not be part of any of these PTAs following Brexit. 
At the sectoral level, our results suggest that the WTO scenario will lead to quite dramatic reductions 
in bilateral exports of key agri-food products from Denmark to the UK, such as processed foods, pork 
products and dairy; however, by taking into account the flexibilities to redirect trade flows within the 
EU27 and to third countries, the overall Danish agri-food exports would fall very little. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic facts on bilateral trade 
patterns between Denmark and the UK and provides more details regarding the two Brexit scenarios 
considered in the study. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion of methodologies, data and the 
construction and implementation of the baseline and scenarios. Section 4 presents the results and the 
analysis of the results. The final section concludes with the main findings and offers some 
qualifications of such findings. 
2 Trade patterns and post-Brexit options 
2.1 Bilateral trade patterns between Denmark and the UK 
The UK is an important export destination for Danish agricultural and food products, particularly for 
the aggregated product categories of processed foods, pork and poultry (which is mainly pork based 
products in the case of Danish exports), and milk and dairy products. During the period of 2011-2013, 
Danish exports of processed foods, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy products were respectively 
in the range of DKK3.9 to 4.5 billion, 4.9-5.7 billion, and 1.3 to 1.8 billion (See Appendix Table 1 
for details; data sourced from the GTAP database), all representing significant shares of total Danish 
exports in those categories. In total, Denmark’s exports of agri-food products to the UK amounted to 
more than DKK 12 billion per year during the 2011-2013 period. In all, Danish exports of agricultural 
and food products to the UK in this period were more than 20 percent of total Danish merchandise 
                                                            
6 Negotiations with Australia and New Zealand are not formally launched yet, although the scoping exercises have been 
concluded. We therefore exclude the prospect FTAs with Australia and New Zealand from our baseline. Likewise, 
future FTAs with the USA and Turkey (agriculture sectors) are not considered in the baseline, either. Current and future 
FTAs that are assumed in the baseline are discussed in Section 3 and are listed in Tables 2 and 3.   
10 
 
exports to the UK.7 In contrast, total agricultural and food imports from the UK to Denmark were 
much smaller, ranging from about DKK 2.6 billion in 2011 to 3.1 billion to 2013. This indicates a 
rather large trade surplus in agricultural and food products for Denmark and points out to the potential 
negative impacts of Brexit on the key agricultural and food sectors.  
2.2 Post-Brexit options 
When the UK leaves the European Union it needs to renegotiate its trade relationships with the 
remaining members of the EU (EU27 hereafter) as well as with third countries with which the EU 
has existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) or is currently negotiating PTAs.  Renegotiated 
trade relationships may imply changes in import tariffs as well as regulation influencing trade flows 
i.e. regulations acting as Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). 
Options for EU27-UK bilateral trade arrangements 
The literature on Brexit has so far revolved around five scenarios or models for the future EU27-UK 
relationship, with different implications on trade costs and consequently trade flows (PwC, 2016, 
Dhingra et al., 2016, Irwin, 2015, van Berkum et al., 2016, Kierzenkowski et al., 2016): 
• The ”Norway model” where the UK joins the European Economic Area (EEA) 
• The ”Switzerland model” where the UK negotiates a set of bilateral agreements with EU27 
regarding trade and factor flows 
• The ”Turkey model” where the UK enters into a customs union with EU27 
• A Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) scenario where tariffs on goods traded between the UK 
and EU27 are partially removed or trade is fully liberalized in which case we refer to it as a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) 
• WTO scenario where the UK trades with EU27 (and all other WTO members) on MFN terms 
The political process for Brexit just got started and clarities on the likely outcomes will not be known 
in the near future. In the current study we therefore focus on two relevant benchmark scenarios: 
• FTA scenario implying zero tariffs on trade between the UK and EU27 (“optimistic” scenario). 
• WTO scenario where the UK trades with EU27 on MFN terms (“pessimistic” scenario) 
                                                            
7 Agricultural and food products are defined as the aggregate of product categories 1-12 and 14-22 in the aggregated 
GTAP database used in this study. For details of these product categories, see Appendix Table 2a.  
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Both scenarios are evaluated against a baseline in which the UK is assumed to stay in the EU. There 
are several reasons for focusing on these two particular scenarios rather than the other scenarios 
mentioned above such as the “Switzerland” and “Norway” models. First, it is difficult to formally 
model deep economic integration á la the “Switzerland” and “Norway” models due to their 
complexity. Second, neither of the “Switzerland” and “Norway” agreements covers trade in 
agricultural products which is the main focus of this study, and this is also the case for the custom 
union between EU and Turkey. Third, the WTO scenario is the most extreme scenario in terms of 
rising trade costs between the UK and EU, as well as between the UK and the EU’s FTA trade 
partners; therefore it is expected that this arrangement would lead to large negative trade effects in a 
“worst” case or “pessimistic” scenario. All other scenarios will lead to impacts that are somewhere 
in between those resulted from the WTO scenario and the status quo (i.e. the UK remaining in the 
EU single market). As the status quo is effectively ruled out by Brexit itself, the best hope for the UK 
to maintain closer trade ties to the EU will have to be some kind of PTA as a “best” case or 
“optimistic” scenario. We therefore assess the potential scope of such an arrangement in an FTA 
scenario in which we assume that the two parties agree to remove all tariff barriers. 
It is important to understand that, even if the UK manages to negotiate an FTA with EU27, such that 
goods trade will not be subject to tariff barriers, this will presumably still lead to an increase in overall 
trade costs. This is partly due to the introduction of border measures required to deal with country of 
origin matters. Moreover, firms will face additional production costs on their exported goods due to 
regulatory divergences over time. For example, future health and labelling standards imposed on 
goods for domestic consumption by the UK government might be different from those applying to 
goods consumed within EU27. Exactly how high the costs are associated with non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) is an empirical question which is subject to considerable debate. 
Options for UK-Third countries arrangements 
The EU has a large number of PTAs with third countries. In fact, according to the WTO, the EU 
currently trades on MFN terms with only 30 countries among which, however, are some of the world’s 
largest agricultural exporters, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Russia and 
the United States. We assume that following Brexit, the UK will have to leave all PTAs it currently 
is a party to as an EU member state. Moreover, the EU is a party to several ongoing trade negotiations 
which UK will lose out on as well, should they materialize in the future. In particular, we assume that 
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the UK will not be able to reach a PTA with Canada, USA or any other country in the time horizon 
under consideration. 
In summary, this study assumes an exit of the UK from EU27’s PTAs under both the WTO and FTA 
scenarios. The UK could, of course, choose to liberalize its trade policy by reducing its MFN tariffs 
unilaterally. However, we will assume that WTO MFN tariffs will apply where applicable implying 
that trade between the UK and relevant third countries will be subject to each of the respective 
countries’ MFN tariffs. 
3 Methodology, data and scenarios 
To understand the potential impacts of different Brexit scenarios on the Danish economy, particularly 
on the agricultural sectors including possible changes in bilateral and total trade flows, sectoral 
production and employment effects, a quantitative economic model is needed. Such a model should 
possess modeling structure and behavior to track the economy-wide and sector specific effects of 
policy changes associated with the assumed Brexit scenarios, not only regarding the implied changes 
on trade flows due to changing bilateral trade costs such as import tariffs and non-tariff barriers but 
also on how changing trade flows influence domestic production and consumption at sectoral and 
aggregated levels. These requirements point to the use of the trade-focused computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Typical CGE models are firmly based on microeconomic theory as they 
assume utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing (or cost minimizing) producers, allow 
for inter-sectoral linkages through input-output linkages and competitions on the factors markets, and 
observe resource constraints with regard to all factor markets. Among existing CGE models, trade 
focused models have been used extensively in the trade policy literature, particularly for ex ante 
evaluations of  changes in trade policy due to formations of preferential trade agreements and of 
options of trade negotiations involving multiple partner countries. 
In this respect, the global CGE modelling framework and database nicknamed GTAP, developed in 
Hertel and Tsigas (1997), is well suited for such purposes. The GTAP model is a widely used multi-
sector and multi-region computable general equilibrium model of the world economy. The standard 
GTAP model assumes perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale technology. Nested 
constant elasticity of substitution production functions are defined over intermediate inputs and 
primary production factors such as land, capital, skilled and unskilled labors and natural resources. 
On the demand side, private demand of a representative private household follows a constant 
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difference in elasticity demand function, which in turn enters into the aggregated demand function 
together with government and saving demands. Countries and regions in the model are linked through 
international trade linkages specified in the Armington structure and a global bank sector that 
intermediates global savings and consumptions (for details see Hertel and Tsigas, 1997). 
Typical ex ante modeling exercises with the GTAP model involves computing a new equilibrium 
solution to the model due to “exogenous” changes to a set of policy variables from the levels 
embodied in the benchmark equilibrium data set (which itself is an equilibrium solution to the model). 
In the case of trade policy changes such as those assumed in the case of Brexit, the differences 
between the new and benchmark equilibria can then be considered as the effects of the assumed policy 
changes. Aside from the assumed changes in policy variables to be discussed in the next subsection, 
another complication is to choose and construct a “business-as-usual” baseline from which the new 
equilibrium solution is to be computed. In this case, the baseline has to be chosen in a year where the 
Brexit scenarios are assumed to take effect. Given the difficulties in predicting when and what kind 
of arrangements will be reached, this paper opts for a simple assumption that the analyzed Brexit 
scenarios would take effect in the year 2021, under the assumptions that Britain would start the 
negotiation process in 2017 and concluding the process within the pre-set 2-year period. 
In the rest of this section, we proceed to the discussion on the baseline, the assumed scenarios, and 
the data used to characterize the scenarios, particularly with respect to the assumed changes to import 
tariffs and ad valorem equivalence of non-tariff barriers. 
3.1 Descriptions of the Baseline and Scenarios 
3.1.1 Database and baseline construction 
 
The most recent and publically available GTAP database has base years in 2004, 2008, and 2011, 
essentially providing three benchmark equilibrium datasets as solutions to the GTAP model. We 
choose the 2011 data set for our purposes as it contains the most up-to-date data and is closest to the 
assumed baseline year of 2021.8  
The GTAP database contains data for 140 countries and 57 sectors. To limit the computation burden 
and for ease of presentation of the results, an aggregated version along both the country and sector 
                                                            
8 As the analysis is built upon the baseline of 2021, a general equilibrium data set with more recent base year would be 
more desirable for projecting the world economy to the baseline year of 2021. However, compiling such a data set is a 
huge undertaking and generally occurs at a time lag of several years.   
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dimensions are used for this analysis. This version covers 28 sectors including 21 agricultural and 
food sectors, 1 aggregated extraction sector, 3 aggregated manufacturing sectors and 3 service sectors, 
and 39 countries and aggregated regions covering multiple countries. A detailed list of sectoral and 
country aggregations is provided in Appendix Tables 2a and 2b. Within the EU, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK are included as individual countries 
and the rest of the EU is aggregated together. Additionally, another 30 countries/regions are included. 
The selection of additional individual countries is based on the economic size and other 
considerations such as whether these countries are part of a preferential trade agreement with the EU. 
The construction of the 2021 baseline is essentially an extrapolation of the 2011 GTAP dataset to the 
year 2021 by targeting current projections on GDP, labor force and population growth for all countries 
and regions included in the model during the 2011-2021 period, while allowing capital and total factor 
productivities to adjust to accommodate the above targets. The data on the targets are sourced from 
Fouré et al. (2012). 
In addition to the macro economic assumptions and adjustment above, in the baseline the following 
assumptions are also adopted: that the UK remains a member of the EU implying no changes to the 
bilateral trade relationship between the two; that existing preferential trade arrangements of the EU 
are maintained, with the UK being a full member in these arrangements; and that several “likely” 
FTAs of the EU are also fully implemented, with the UK being a full member in these new FTAs, 
including those with Canada, Mexico, Mercosur, Japan, and several individual members of ASEAN 
(Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines). This implies that the bilateral tariff barriers 
within these arrangements are removed. Possible future FTAs with the US, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Turkey (agriculture sectors) are excluded from the baseline, due to considerations of the current 
negotiation status. This means that the status quo regarding bilateral trade relationships between the 
EU and these countries is maintained in the baseline; similarly, no changes to the bilateral trade 
relationship between the UK and these countries are assumed in the Brexit scenarios to be detailed 
below.    
3.1.2 Description of the scenarios 
 
Following earlier discussions in this study, two core scenarios are considered in this study, namely 
the FTA scenario under which the UK forms a free trade area with the EU, and the WTO scenario 
where the UK and EU treat each other’s exports on the WTO MFN terms. In the first scenario, zero 
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tariffs are assumed between the UK and EU for all products. However, non-tariff barriers related to 
standards and regulatory differences would rise, so would the cost related to the need to establish 
rules of origin. These considerations effectively increase trade costs between the two sides. In the 
case of the WTO scenario, the UK and EU are assumed to raise the bilateral import tariff rates to the 
levels of the EU’s common external tariffs, as these also represent the UK’s MFN tariff in the WTO. 
Moreover, non-tariff measures also rise in this case. 
Therefore, the bilateral trade barriers in both scenarios rise for the UK and EU. Additionally, as 
discussed earlier, we also assume the UK has to exit the various PTAs negotiated by the EU with 
third countries. As such, bilateral tariffs between the UK and these third countries have to rise to their 
respective WTO MFN levels in both scenarios.    
3.2 Data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
This section provides a more detailed account on the data underlying the two core scenarios, including 
both import tariffs and ad valorem equivalence of non-tariff barriers.  
3.2.1 MFN tariffs of the EU 
Figure 1 illustrates EU’s current MFN tariffs. The numbers, which are based on the GTAP database, 
are averages of the individual tariff lines belonging to each of the 28 product categories considered 
in this study, weighted by the amount of import from the main EU MFN trade partners. 
One major difficulty of such an aggregation exercise is that many of the underlying individual tariff 
lines are specific tariffs or a mix of specific and ad valorem tariffs. To take an example, consider 
“Fresh, chilled or frozen cuts of sheep with bone in” with the six digit HS12 number 020422. This 
product category consists of 4 underlying (8 digit) tariff lines (referring to more specific cuts). EU’s 
applied MFN tariffs on imports of these cuts of sheep consists of an ad valorem tariff of 12.8% + a 
specific tariff ranging from 119.9 to 222.7 EUR/100 kg.9 In order to find the ad-valorem equivalent 
(AVE) tariff of each of these mixed tariffs one needs to know the quantity and value of the affected 
trade flows for determining a unit value as a base for finding the AVE. 
Another complication arises from the fact that the trade values that are needed to calculate AVEs of 
specific tariffs are affected by the tariffs themselves. This issue also makes it difficult to calculate 
appropriate average AVEs for the aggregated product categories. On the one hand, it does not make 
                                                            
9 This information is obtained from the http://tariffdata.wto.org/Default.aspx on the WTO website. 
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sense to take a simple average of the AVE tariffs of the underlying disaggregated tariff lines since it 
implies that all products are weighted equally. On the other hand, a weighted average where tariffs 
applied to trade flows representing the most value are given larger weights will be biased towards 
zero exactly because high tariffs reduce trade.  
In light of these issues the EU MFN tariffs illustrated in Figure 1 are not calculated from the raw tariff 
data available from the WTO. Instead we used the MAcMap-HS6 database of tariff protection which 
is part of the GTAP database (see Guimbard et al., 2012), where all tariffs have been converted to 
their AVEs (which solves the first challenge mentioned above). Specifically, we compiled a list of 
countries trading with the EU on MFN terms. Then, we calculated the average AVE tariff for each of 
the 28 aggregated product categories considered in this report, where each individual tariff line is 
weighted by the corresponding value of EU’s import from all its MFN partners. Although this 
procedure does not take care of the bias problem entirely, as a practical solution it generates more 
sensible aggregated average tariffs compared to the bilateral trade shared-weighted tariffs, because 
the trade weights chosen here likely to be less biased than trade weights associated with one particular 
trade partner. In essence, the logic behind this method is similar to the reference group weighting 
method used for compiling the MAcMap-HS6 database at HS-6 level. 
 
Figure 1. EU MFN tariffs. Source: Own calculations based on the GTAP database. Note: labels refer 
to product categories according to the GTAP classification 
As can be seen from Figure 1 above, the EU sectors with the highest levels of protection are sugar, 
bovine meat, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy. It should be noted that pork and poultry, and milk 
and dairy are among key exports from Denmark to the UK. 
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3.2.2 MFN tariffs of the third countries 
As discussed earlier, another complication arising from BREXIT is that the UK may need to exit all 
PTAs negotiated by the EU, as assumed in both of our scenarios. Therefore, we need to find the 
aggregated MFN tariffs that would be imposed by these countries on the UK exports. We follow the 
same procedure outlined in the previous section to generate these aggregated average MFN tariffs. 
Table 2 presents the aggregated average MFN tariffs on the 28 product categories for 7 important 
countries with an existing EU PTA. The numbers are calculated the same way as those in Figure 1 
i.e. they represent averages of individual disaggregated tariffs weighted by each of the countries’ 
imports from its major trade partners. It is worth noting that these countries have very high MFN 
tariffs on several food products but there are quite a lot of variations across countries and products. 
We are assuming that the UK will be facing these tariffs when exporting to these countries following 
Brexit. On the other hand, these countries will be facing the current EU MFN tariffs shown in Figure 
1 when exporting to the UK. Trade between EU27 and the countries listed in Table 1 will be subject 
to the existing preferential import tariffs. 
Similarly, we assume in both scenarios that the UK would not be part of the PTAs that are currently 
under negotiations. As these PTAs are assumed to be implemented by 2021, the MFN tariffs of the 
partner countries to these future PTAs would also prevail for exports originated from the UK. 
Table 2. Third-country MFN tariffs on food import by partner countries in existing EU PTAs (%) 
 Korea Switzerland Norway Turkey Ukraine South Africa Egypt 
Paddy rice 5.0 0.4 17.5 32.0 4.3 0.0 1.7 
Wheat 1.7 37.7 125.2 65.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 
Other grains 426.3 10.5 90.2 42.4 0.4 0.7 0.0 
Veg_fruits 46.5 8.1 7.6 25.0 2.5 7.2 2.4 
Oilseeds  420.1 11.8 17.9 4.2 4.4 8.6 0.2 
Sugar cane/beets 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plant fibers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.0 
Other crops 34.7 5.0 12.3 22.9 1.6 51.2 9.0 
Processed rice 5.0 1.7 11.9 28.6 4.9 0.0 2.0 
Sugar 9.4 3.8 55.8 31.2 49.4 0.0 2.5 
Processed food 40.7 9.2 19.3 15.7 5.3 7.2 43.2 
Beverage tobacco 55.0 16.4 9.5 9.3 9.7 6.6 526.7 
Bovine animal 8.6 35.6 1.7 18.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bovine meats 34.7 47.3 178.7 2.0 13.8 16.4 1.0 
Pork&poultry 24.3 75.6 17.3 10.4 10.0 14.2 29.4 
Other animal products 6.2 1.4 1.1 3.1 6.9 1.0 2.1 
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Vegetable oils 7.3 37.7 41.8 16.4 0.4 8.2 2.2 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Milk&dairy 58.3 58.0 32.3 166.3 9.4 12.7 4.8 
Wool 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fisheries 17.0 0.1 0.2 32.1 7.1 1.5 4.8 
Source: Own calculations based on the GTAP database 
 
Table 3. Third-country MFN tariffs on food import by realistic future EU27 PTA partners (%) 
 Canada Vietnam Japan Brazil Argentia Thailand IdnPhl Mexico 
Paddy rice 0.0 39.8 410.6 7.7 3.0 30.0 50.0 0.0 
Wheat 0.0 1.7 22.1 4.9 4.8 27.0 4.1 0.1 
Other grains 0.0 13.4 8.0 2.8 0.5 20.7 5.3 6.0 
Veg_fruits 0.1 20.8 12.3 10.7 8.7 26.7 6.6 32.1 
Oilseeds  0.0 0.1 1.2 4.1 4.0 13.2 2.5 0.4 
Sugar cane/beets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Plant fibers 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other crops 0.6 22.6 0.3 3.7 2.4 36.0 5.1 2.3 
Processed rice 0.0 27.8 241.2 8.5 2.6 23.0 9.0 0.3 
Sugar 0.1 12.3 14.5 11.3 8.1 36.6 9.6 41.2 
Processed food 12.7 12.8 10.9 11.7 12.6 8.3 10.1 14.8 
Beverage tobacco 2.9 45.5 6.8 19.9 18.0 26.7 10.7 2.1 
Bovine animal 0.0 0.2 10.4 0.5 0.4 5.2 4.7 0.0 
Bovine meats 0.5 12.1 33.8 7.7 4.4 31.0 7.2 11.2 
Pork&poultry 56.4 15.3 62.4 10.4 7.8 3.2 24.9 11.9 
Other animal products 15.6 1.0 4.8 5.7 3.5 7.0 4.5 2.6 
Vegetable oils 6.0 0.6 2.0 10.0 11.5 15.5 1.6 1.2 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Milk&dairy 201.4 3.6 61.8 15.3 17.6 11.6 3.7 26.7 
Wool 0.0 0.2 23.6 0.0 7.6 0.1 0.3 1.0 
Fisheries 0.0 4.1 4.6 4.8 1.2 5.5 4.6 10.4 
Source: Own calculations based on the GTAP database. Note: Brazil, Argentina and Mexico are 
currently negotiating an FTA with the EU as members of the Mercosur FTA 
 
Table 3 presents the MFN tariffs for eight countries that are currently negotiating PTAs with the EU. 
As in Table 2, there are a lot of variations in the tariffs applied to imports of different products within 
and across these countries. We are assuming that the UK exports to these countries will be subject to 
the tariffs in Table 2 following Brexit; moreover, tariffs applying to trade between the countries listed 
in Table 2 and the EU27 will be removed completely in the baseline and remains zero in the two 
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scenarios. That is, we are assuming that the countries listed in Table 2 manage to agree on an FTA 
with EU27 covering all products. Finally,Table 4 shows the MFN tariffs of 3 possible future EU27 
PTA partners that will be imposed by these partners on exports from the UK. Note that these countries 
have relatively low tariffs on all products.  
Table 4. Third-country MFN tariffs on food import. Possible future EU27 PTA partners (%) 
 Australia New Zealand USA 
Paddy rice 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Wheat 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Other grains 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Veg_fruits 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Oilseeds  0.0 0.0 1.2 
Sugar cane/beets 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Plant fibers 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other crops 0.1 0.2 1.2 
Processed rice 0.0 0.0 3.7 
Sugar 0.0 0.0 12.3 
Processed food 2.0 2.8 3.2 
Beverage tobacco 2.9 2.1 1.1 
Bovine animal 0.0 0.0 2.5 
Bovine meats 0.0 0.2 2.9 
Pork&poultry 0.1 2.6 1.1 
Other animal products 0.2 0.0 0.5 
Vegetable oils 0.1 0.2 1.6 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Milk&dairy 4.6 3.8 10.5 
Wool 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Fisheries 0.9 0.0 0.2 
Source: Own calculations based on the GTAP database. 
In terms of implementation of the baseline and scenarios, the baseline represents the situation where 
the UK would be part of these existing and future PTAs, therefore exports from the UK would be 
subject to the preferential tariffs. In the WTO and FTA scenarios, however, exports from the UK 
would be met with the MFN tariffs on the markets of the third countries, implying that tariffs would 
rise to the relevant MFN levels presented in tables 2-5. 
3.2.3 NTBs in the scenarios 
Figure 2 illustrates our assumptions regarding administrative trade costs in ad valorem equivalents 
(AVEs) applying to trade flows between FTA partners as compared with EU’s common market. That 
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is, the numbers indicate how much higher the UK-EU27 trade costs will be if the UK manages to 
negotiate an FTA with EU27 following Brexit. 
 
Figure 2. NTBs in the FTA scenario.  Source: Own calculations based on Egger et al. (2015) 
The numbers are based on those in Egger et al. (2015) but adapted to the aggregation scheme used in 
this report. We distinguish between two types of administrative trade costs, namely Rules of Origin 
(ROO) costs and regulatory barriers (NTBs). 
ROO costs are incurred when officials must spend resources determining the extent to which an 
imported product is produced in a PTA partner country rather than a third-country without preferential 
access. In line with the literature we assume that ROO costs amount to 4 percent of the CIF (Cost, 
Insurance and Freight) price in most cases (e.g. Carrère and De Melo, 2006). NTBs (Non-Tariff 
Barriers) are costs associated with regulatory differences across countries such as labelling 
requirements, health standards, control procedures etc. Although UK’s regulation is currently based 
on the EU one, it is assumed that the two will diverge over time following Brexit. When a product 
must satisfy different standards in different markets producers must devote resources to comply with 
these different rules which increase costs. We therefore assume that CIF prices on goods traded 
between EU27 and the UK will increase by these amounts in FTA scenario. It should be noted that 
these numbers are subject to considerable uncertainty. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the NTB costs in ad valorem equivalents that we assume apply to trade flows 
between MFN trade partners. EU’s current MFN tariffs from Figure 1 are also shown for comparison. 
The source of the NTB numbers is the same as above. In general, current literature finds that the EU’s 
NTBs for agriculture imports from non-EU member states are much higher than the corresponding 
MFN tariffs, indicating that the NTBs may be a more important trade barrier for the UK and EU27 
to access each other’s markets following Brexit.   
Figure 3. NTBs in the WTO scenario.  Source: Own calculations based on Egger et al. (2015) 
As also found in the literature (e.g. Egger et al., 2015), NTB costs are higher when trade partners are 
not part of a PTA and therefore trade on WTO MFN basis. In the context of the EU and UK, the 
reason that NTB costs are higher in the WTO scenario than in the FTA scenario is due to additional 
regulatory divergences between EU27 and the UK in the latter scenario. Based on the estimates of 
Egger et al. (2015) and following the application of their estimates in Rojas-Romagosa (2016), we 
assume that the NTBs in the WTO scenario are twice as high as in the FTA scenario which makes 
them much higher than the tariffs for most of the product categories, as can be seen in Figure 3 (also 
note that we assume zero ROO costs in the WTO scenario). For instance, the AVEs of the NTBs in 
the crop sectors are above 20 percent and are much higher than the corresponding MFN tariff rates; 
in the case of processed food, beverage and tobacco, and meat and dairy products, the AVEs of the 
associated NTBs exceed 40 percent. Therefore, it is expected that much of the trade-reducing effects 
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of Brexit under the WTO scenario will be driven by these assumptions. Owing to the fact that current 
literature only contains relatively few estimates on the NTBs (such as the widely referenced estimates 
from Egger et al. (2015)), caution should be exercised when perusing the results based on these 
estimates. 
4 Results 
This section first reports the main simulation results at sectoral levels, including changes in bilateral 
trade flows from Denmark to the UK with focus on key agricultural sectors, and changes in sectoral 
outputs and employment. Following that, key aggregated results are also reported, mainly on GDP. 
In addition to reporting the total effects for the two scenarios, a decomposition analysis is also offered 
regarding how changes in trade barriers by different parties (i.e. UK, EU27, and third countries) and 
different types of trade costs (i.e. NTBs vs. import tariffs) contribute to the total effects. In relation 
to the latter point and for clarity of presentation, an extra simulation is conducted in the WTO scenario 
where the MFN tariffs are assumed but not the NTBs. This extra scenario is named WTO-MFN only 
and the complete WTO scenario is named WTO MFN+NTB. It should also be noted that the results 
reported here are based on a comparative static framework whereby the assumed time horizon is of 
the “medium run” nature. In addition, several likely EU FTAs with third countries are assumed in the 
baseline; therefore, the results reported here reflect these assumptions as well.  
4.1 Bilateral and total export flows from Denmark 
With rising bilateral trade costs, Danish exports of key agri-food products to the UK would 
drop from the baseline levels in both the WTO and FTA scenarios. The magnitude of changes 
from the baseline depends on the assumed rising trade costs. For instance, as shown in  
Table 5, exports of processed food products, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy products are 
predicted to decrease by between 71 and 94 percent under the WTO MFN+NTB scenario, due to the 
assumed increase in both MFN tariffs and NTBs, whereas in the case of the FTA scenario, decreases 
in bilateral exports to the UK are in the order of 44 (processed food) to 56 percent (for milk and 
dairy). Under the WTO MFN+NTB scenario, the assumed increases in NTBs appear to be more 
damaging (than the MFN tariffs) to many of Denmark’s exports to the UK, as can be seen from the 
first column in Table 5 where the effects from raising the MFN tariffs only (i.e. the WTO MFN only 
scenario) are reported. In that case, reductions in bilateral exports to the UK for other food, pork and 
poultry, and milk and dairy would be about 26, 47, and 74 percent (as compared to 71, 94 and 93 
percent) respectively. 
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Overall, simulation results suggest that total Danish exports to the UK would be reduced from the 
baseline by nearly 51 percent under the WTO MFN+NTB scenario and 36 percent under the FTA 
scenario (see Table 6). Within the WTO scenario, if the assumed NTBs were absent, total Danish 
exports to the UK would only drop by 10 percent. For agri-food products, Danish exports to the UK 
would decrease more in both the WTO and FTA scenarios (79 and nearly 48 percent, respectively), 
as compared to the aforementioned results for total bilateral exports. This reflects the higher trade 
costs that would be imposed on agri-food exports under the two Brexit scenarios. Similarly, when the 
assumed NTBs were absent under the WTO scenario, Danish agri-food exports would be reduced by 
about 39 percent, about half of the simulated percentage changes when rising trade costs associated 
with the assumed NTB are considered. 
 
Table 5. Changes in bilateral exports from Denmark to UK, % from baseline  
WTO (MFN only) WTO (MFN+NTB) FTA 
Vegetable and Fruits -7.4 -38.5 -24.7 
Oilseeds 0.1 -59 -48.9 
processed foods -25.9 -70.7 -44.3 
beverage_tabacco -8.5 -41.8 -26.6 
Bovinemeats -93.6 -97.7 -70.5 
Porkpoultry -46.7 -94.3 -51 
other animal products 10.4 -14 -7.2 
vegetable oils -1.7 -85.7 -68.5 
Milkdairy -73.8 -92.6 -56.6 
Note: WTO (MFN only) refers to the WTO scenario with increasing MFN tariff only; WTO 
(MFN+NTB) refers to the WTO scenario with increasing MFN tariffs and rising NTBs; FTA refers 
to the FTA scenario. Source: simulation results by authors.  
 
Table 6. Bilateral exports from Denmark to UK (million USD)   
2011 2021 
baseline 
WTO  
(MFN 
only) 
WTO 
(MFN+NTB) 
FTA 
Vegetable and Fruits 3.8 4.1 3.8 2.5 3.1 
Oilseeds 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 
Processed food 
products 
739 708 524 207 393 
Beverage&tabacco 44 45 41 26 33 
Bovinemeats 34 27 2 1 8 
Pork&poultry 1068 565 301 32 276 
Other animal products 7 8 9 7 7 
Vegetable oil 14 14 14 2 5 
Milk&dairy 342 280 73 21 121 
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Total 11,296 11,024 9,894 5,432 7,08
5 
Total agrifood 2,368 1,803 1,103 372 945 
% from base2021, 
agrifood products 
  
-38.8 -79.3 -47.6 
% from base2021, all 
products 
  
-10.3 -50.7 -35.7 
Source: simulation results by authors.  
While the simulation results for the two Brexit scenarios point to very large reductions in Danish 
exports to the UK, particularly for processed foods, pork products, and milk and dairy, total Danish 
exports may not drop as much even though the UK is an important destination for Danish exports. 
This is because the remaining EU single market which is still much larger than the UK market would 
allow for potentials to redirect significant exports within the single market in the event of rising trade 
costs on the UK market. Additionally, trade costs for exporting to third countries’ markets are either 
assumed to be unchanged or lowered (due to the additional PTAs of the EU) in the baseline, relatively 
speaking these markets become more attractive for Danish exports as compared to the UK market. 
Therefore, these third country markets provide another channel for re-directing Danish exports.  
Table 7. Changes in total exports from Denmark, % from baseline  
WTO (MFN only) WTO (MFN+NTB) FTA 
Vegetable and Fruits 0.8 1.9 1 
Oilseeds 0.8 3.1 1.8 
Processed foods -1.3 -4.1 -2.4 
Beverage_tobacco 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Bovinemeats -1.4 1.3 1.1 
Porkpoultry -1.6 -2.7 -1.3 
Other animal products 0.6 1.6 1 
Vegetable oils 0.3 -1.7 -1.6 
Milk&dairy -3.3 -3.3 -1.3 
Source: simulation results by authors.  
Indeed, simulation results reported in Table 7 suggest very modest reductions in total Danish agri-
food exports under both the WTO and FTA scenarios. For processed foods, pork and poultry, and 
milk and dairy products, total exports would drop by 4.1, 2.7, and 3.3 percent under the WTO 
MFN+NTB scenario and by 2.4, 1.3 and 1.3 percent under the FTA scenario. Note that these 
simulated percentage reductions of total exports are far smaller than the percentage changes reported 
for Danish exports destined to the UK markets, even after those percentage changes are scaled down 
by UK’s shares of total Danish exports. This is indeed consistent with additional simulation results 
(as reported in Appendix Table 3 for the case of pork products) that Danish exports to other markets 
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rise, particularly for products that would be affected the most by Brexit. In the case of pork products, 
simulation results from the WTO scenario reported in Appendix Table 3 suggest notable increases in 
exports to non-EU markets such as China and Japan, among others. Within the EU, pork exports are 
expected to rise for Germany, Poland, Ireland, Italy and France. These increases would lead to a 
smaller overall reduction in pork export volume from Denmark as well as an even smaller percentage 
reduction.10  
Overall, total Danish exports would drop by 0.43 and 0.29 percent in the WTO and FTA scenarios 
(as reported in Appendix Table 4), as compared to the much larger decreases in overall exports from 
the UK at respectively 9.33 and 7.23 percent in the same two scenarios. These aggregated results 
again demonstrate the asymmetric nature of the negative trade effects of Brexit, with the negative 
burden being placed disproportionately larger on the UK. By the same measure, most other EU 
member states would also suffer from Brexit, notably Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Italy 
and Germany. On the other hand, marginal increases in total exports are expected from countries such 
as Vietnam, Thailand, Switzerland, and Turkey. These countries – which either have already 
completed PTAs with the EU or are assumed to have concluded PTAs with the EU in the baseline – 
are expected to increase their trade flows with the EU27, while trade flows between the UK and EU27 
are expected to shrink due to Brexit. 
4.2 Changes in domestic outputs 
Results from section 4.1 suggest very large reductions in agri-food exports from Denmark to the UK 
but quite modest reductions in total agri-food exports from Denmark. Therefore, it is expected that 
the domestic market effects of Brexit for the Danish agricultural sectors are to be mainly influenced 
by the simulated total export effect rather than the effect on bilateral exports to the UK. Table 8 
provides the simulated results due to the WTO (including both the WTO MFN and WTO MFN+NTB 
scenarios) and the FTA scenarios. 
For the three key agri-food sectors (i.e. processed foods, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy), the 
main WTO scenario (i.e. WTO MFN+NTB) would lead to reductions in domestic output similar in 
magnitude to those of total Danish exports, ranging from 2.5 percent for processed foods, 2.2 percent 
for pork and poultry , to 1.1 percent for milk and dairy. Without considering rising NTBs, as in the 
                                                            
10 Given the contrast between the very large impacts on bilateral exports from Denmark to the UK caused by reductions 
in tariffs and NTBs and the much smaller impacts on overall Danish exports, the uncertainties associated with the 
underlying assumptions on the NTBs are unlikely to have substantial impact on the size of the latter effect.  
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WTO MFN scenario, decreases in domestic outputs would be mostly smaller, with domestic outputs 
for processed foods, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy dropping by 0.8, 1.2 and 1.1 percent 
respectively. Under the FTA scenario, reductions in domestic outputs are also of smaller magnitude 
for these three key products (by 1.4, 1, and 0.3 percent respectively).  
Table 8. Changes in domestic production, % from baseline  
WTO (MFN only) WTO (MFN+NTB) FTA 
Vegetable and Fruits 0.46 0.99 0.55 
oilseeds 0.58 2.22 1.26 
other crops 0.24 -0.15 -0.38 
processed foods -0.76 -2.51 -1.44 
beverage_tabacco 0.12 0.24 0.16 
bovinemeats  -0.54 1.31 1.05 
Porkpoultry -1.22 -2.17 -1.01 
other animal products -0.63 -1.02 -0.4 
vegetable oils 0.17 -1.34 -1.19 
Milkdairy -1.09 -1.08 -0.26 
Fishery -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
Source: simulation results by authors.  
Another simulation result deserving some attention is the slight increase of total exports of several 
other agrifood products such as vegetable and fruits, oilseeds, beverage and tobacco, bovine meats 
and other animal products by between 0.5 to 3.1 percent (see Table 7). These products are not 
currently heavily exported by Denmark to the UK and therefore are products that would be directly 
impacted relatively little by the assumed Brexit scenarios. However, as a result of resource 
reallocations associated with decreasing total exports and outputs in some key agrifood sectors, these 
sectors that would be relatively unaffected by Brexit would attract economic resources such as labor 
and land away from those negatively impacted sectors in a general equilibrium setting, particularly 
in the medium and longer run. In fact, even though Danish exports of these products to the UK are 
currently very small, total Danish exports of these products to the world are not negligible 
(particularly for beverage and tobacco and bovine meats). This explains their rising outputs and 
exports.            
4.3 Employment effects 
Underlying the simulated changes in domestic outputs reported in section 4.2 are reallocations of 
economic resources such as primary production factors (i.e. land, labor, and capital), as well as 
changing demand for intermediate inputs. Of particular societal concern is the possible employment 
effect arising from the assumed Brexit scenarios. While the GTAP model used for the current study 
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assumes full employment of all primary factors including skilled and unskilled labor and the 
simulation results are of the “medium run” nature (i.e. all markets including factor markets are in 
equilibrium), the simulated changes in sectoral employment may be considered an indication of 
sectoral unemployment, particularly in the short run where the labor market is adjusting to 
accommodate the reallocated workers in other sectors.      
Table 9. Changes in sectoral employment, % from baseline 
 WTO (MFN only) MFN (MFN+NTB) FTA  
Unskilled 
labor 
Skilled 
labor 
Unskilled 
labor 
Skilled 
labor 
Unskilled 
labor 
Skilled 
labor 
Vegetable and 
Fruits 
0.4 0.4 0.95 0.91 0.56 0.53 
Oilseeds 0.53 0.52 2.24 2.21 1.3 1.28 
Processed 
food products 
-0.74 -0.77 -2.4 -2.6 -1.4 -1.5 
Beverage&tab
acco 
0.14 0.11 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Bovine animal -0.39 -0.39 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 
Bovinemeats -0.52 -0.55 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 
Pork&poultry -1.2 -1.23 -2.1 -2.2 -1.0 -1.0 
other animal 
products 
-0.76 -0.77 -1.2 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5 
vegetable oil 0.19 0.16 -1.3 -1.4 -1.1 -1.2 
Raw milk -1.11 -1.12 -1.3 -1.3 -0.4 -0.4 
milk&dairy -1.07 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 -0.2 -0.3 
Source: simulation results by authors.  
Table 9 therefore reports simulated changes in sectoral employment for both skilled and unskilled 
workers in the Danish agricultural sectors. Under the WTO MFN+NTB scenario, Danish processed 
foods, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy sectors are expected to experience reduced employment 
of unskilled workers by respectively 2.4, 2.1, and 1 percent and employment of skilled workers by 
similar magnitudes. Without the assumed increase in NTBs (i.e. WTO MFN only scenario), simulated 
reduction of sectoral employment in processed food sector would be about one-third of that under the 
WTO MFN+NTB scenario; for pork and poultry, employment would be reduced by about 1.2 percent; 
for the milk and dairy sector, the employment effect would be similar between the WTO MFN and 
WTO MFN+NTB scenarios (however, labor force in producing raw milk would shrink more in the 
latter scenario). Under the FTA scenario, smaller simulated reductions of sectoral employment are 
observed, as compared to the WTO MFN+NTB scenario, with unskilled (skilled) employment for 
processed foods, pork and poultry, and milk and dairy dropping by 1.4 (1.5), 1.1 (1), and 0.2 (0.3) 
percent, respectively.    
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4.4 Macroeconomic effects 
To measure the macroeconomic impacts of the two Brexit scenarios, changes of gross national 
products (GDP) from the baseline are presented in Table 10. Other macroeconomic effects such as 
changes in price levels and economic welfare can also be potentially interesting11; however, as the 
main focus of the report is on Danish industry interests, GDP appears to be a more appropriate 
measure for discussion. To develop some comparative perspectives, in what follows we discuss 
percentage changes of nominal GDP for both Denmark and UK from the baseline levels. Finally, to 
better understand the GDP effects in connection with the trade policy shocks assumed in the two 
scenarios, contributions of individual policy shocks to the combined GDP effects are computed 
separately for each of the two scenarios.  
In the WTO scenario with both increasing MFN tariff and NTBs, Denmark’s GDP would decrease 
by less than two-third of a percentage point from the baseline, as compared to the much larger loss of 
GDP for the UK at 4.8 percent. As reported in Table 10 the much smaller GDP reduction effect for 
Denmark can be decomposed into four components:   
• 1.1 percent reduction to Denmark’s GDP, due to rising trade costs by the UK (i.e. MFN tariffs 
and NTBs) against exports from Denmark, as these extra trade costs reduce Denmark’s exports;  
• 0.35 percent increase in Denmark’s GDP, due to rising trade costs by the EU (including Denmark) 
on UK exports as these trade costs reduce UK’s exports to Denmark and lead to higher domestic 
outputs in Denmark; 
• 0.06 percent increase in Denmark’s GDP, due to rising trade costs by UK on exports originated 
from the EU’s FTA partner countries, as these trade costs reduce the partner countries’ exports to 
the UK, thereby increasing the UK’s domestic production and its imports from elsewhere 
(including those from EU member states); 
• and similarly 0.01 percent increase in Denmark’s GDP, due to rising trade costs by the EU’s FTA 
partner countries against exports from the UK, as these trade costs lowers exports from the UK 
to the FTA partner countries, thereby indirectly increasing exports from EU member states to 
their FTA partner countries. 
                                                            
11 It is worth noting that with rising bilateral trade barriers/costs, aggregated export price indices for exports from both 
the EU (including Denmark) and the UK would decrease under both the WTO and the FTA scenarios. For instance, 
Denmark’s export price indices by products would decrease by between 0.3 and 0.6 percent under the FTA scenario, 
and by between 0.4-0.9 percent under the WTO scenario.  
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Overall, the last two effects appear to be rather insignificant,12 while the negative effects due to rising 
UK trade costs are expected to be partially offset by the positive GDP effect from rising EU trade 
costs against UK exports. 
Table 10. Changes in GDP from baseline, % from baseline 
 Effects due to 
  Total 
effects  
Rising UK 
trade costs on 
EU exports 
Rising EU 
trade costs on 
UK exports 
Rising UK trade costs 
on exports from EU 
FTA countries 
Rising trade costs by 
EU FTA countries on 
UK exports 
 
WTO (MFN+NTB) 
 
DK -0.64 
(-0.15) 
-1.09 0.35 0.06 0.01 
UK -4.82 
(-1.08) 
1.24 -6.05 0.43 -0.54 
  
  
   
FTA 
DK -0.44 
(-0.09) 
-0.76 0.22 0.08 0.01 
UK -3.41 
(-0.61) 
1.04 -4.25 0.33 -0.52 
Note: except numbers in parentheses which are defined in the GTAP model as percentage changes 
in quantity of GDP, all other numbers are percentage changes in the values of GDP. 
Source: own simulation results with the GTAP model and database.   
Similarly, the much larger negative GDP effect on the UK can be decomposed into contributions 
from the same four policy shocks, as reported in Table 10. In particular, rising trade costs by the EU 
alone would reduce UK GDP by over 6 percent, which is expected to be partially offset by a 1.2 
percent increase due to rising trade costs by the UK itself. Additionally, rising trade costs by the UK 
against exports from EU FTA partner countries also increase UK GDP by 0.43 percent; however, a 
slightly large decrease in the UK GDP is expected from rising trade costs by the EU FTA partner 
countries against exports from the UK. 
Under the FTA scenario, reductions of GDP in Denmark and the UK are expected to be at 0.44 and 
3.4 percent respectively, smaller than those simulated under the WTO scenario. In the case of 
Denmark, this aggregated GDP effect can again be decomposed by the four different policy shocks, 
                                                            
12 If instead the UK is included in the FTAs negotiated by the EU with third countries, these small positive GDP effects 
(at about 0.07 percent) would disappear, resulting in slightly smaller GDP gains for Denmark.   
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with rising trade costs by the UK reducing Denmark’s GDP by about three-fourth of a percentage 
point and other policy shocks provide offsetting GDP effects. For the UK, rising trade costs by the 
EU and the EU FTA partner countries would reduce UK’s GDP by nearly 4.8 percent, whereas rising 
trade costs by the UK against the EU and its FTA partner countries provide smaller positive effects. 
In summary, as measured by changes in GDP values from the baseline, under the WTO scenario it 
appears that Denmark would suffer a loss of GDP at around two-third of a percentage point whereas 
the loss of GDP for the UK to be much larger at nearly 5 percent. The major driving forces behind 
the negative GDP effects for Denmark (UK) are the rising trade barriers by the UK (Denmark). For 
each of the two countries, its own rising trade barriers would moderate but would not be enough to 
offset these GDP losses. Additionally, while rising trade barriers between the UK and the EU’s FTA 
partner countries would increase Denmark’s GDP marginally, rising bilateral trade barriers by the 
UK and by the EU’s FTA partner countries would generate opposite GDP effects for the UK. In the 
FTA scenario, similar patterns are observed, albeit with smaller scale.13  
It is worth noting that the above reported percentage changes in nominal GDP reflect both changes 
in the levels of gross domestic outputs and in the levels of the associated prices. When the price levels 
are taken out, real GDP would decrease at a much smaller scale for both countries under the two 
scenarios. For instance, under the WTO scenario, real GDP in Denmark would only shrink by 0.15 
percent and that in the UK would decrease by 1.08 percent (see numbers in parentheses in Table 10). 
A simple explanation for the much smaller real GDP effect is that rising trade costs due to Brexit 
drives up domestic prices of imported goods. 
5. Conclusion and discussions 
With the UK referendum paving the way for the UK to exit the EU, there has been pressing demand 
on understanding its potential impacts. In the case of Denmark, UK has been a very important trade 
partner in general and a particularly important export destination for a number of agricultural and 
food products. This study therefore offers a set of simulation results obtained from a CGE modeling 
exercise under two specific Brexit scenarios to meet this need. The scenarios considered include a 
“normal” FTA between the UK and EU and a WTO scenario in which the two sides have to treat each 
other on ordinary WTO MFN terms. What differentiates the current study from existing studies rests 
                                                            
13 As the baseline assumes several FTAs likely to be agreed or implemented in 2021, there are some further flexibilities 
for remaining EU members including Denmark to redirect trade away from UK. Therefore, in the absence of these 
assumed FTAs, it is possible that the negative trade and GDP effects arising from Brexit would be larger.  
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on three points. First, the current study has an explicit focus on the impact on Danish agricultural 
sectors, particularly in relation to processed foods, pork products, and milk and dairy products. This 
is a key difference from most of the existing studies that are focused on the macroeconomic effects 
of Brexit. Second, we consider not only the rising tariff barriers but also rising NTBs across different 
sectors, particularly in the WTO scenario where the latter is likely to rise substantially. And indeed 
these NTBs have very significant effects on the results. Third, the two scenarios examined in the 
current study not only consider rising total trade costs between the EU (including Denmark) and the 
UK, they also take into consideration potential complications arising from the need for the UK to 
reconfigure its trade arrangement with the EU’s FTA partner countries. Towards this end, we assume 
that the UK will have to exit these FTA arrangements. Such an assumption has important implications 
for both the UK and EU (including Denmark) in connections with their ability to redirect bilateral 
trade flows. 
Simulation results obtained from the modeling exercises of the current study are of the “medium-run” 
nature, as all domestic and international markets are assumed to be in equilibrium following the 
assumed trade policy shocks. As compared to a baseline for the year 2021, simulation results suggest 
that bilateral exports from Denmark to the UK would shrink significantly under the WTO scenario, 
particularly for key export products such as processed foods, pork products, and dairy. Total Danish 
food and agricultural exports to the UK would fall by as much as 80 percent under the WTO scenario 
and by about 48 percent under the FTA scenario, under the assumed increases in bilateral tariffs and 
NTBs between the EU and UK as well as rising tariffs between the UK and third countries with which 
the EU has FTA arrangements. On the flip side, the UK’s agri-food exports are also expected to drop 
significantly.  
Despite the very large simulated decrease in bilateral exports from Denmark to the UK, results from 
model simulations also suggest that reductions of total Danish agri-food exports would be quite 
limited. For pork, dairy, processed foods, the simulated reductions in exports are between 2.7 and 4.1 
percent only. This seemingly surprising result – given the UK’s significant share in total Danish 
exports in these sectors – is due to the possibilities for Danish exports to be redirected within the EU 
and to third countries particularly those countries which are partners to the various preferential trade 
agreements of the EU assumed in the baseline. It should however be noted that redirected Danish 
exports to other markets would be accompanied by slightly reduced export prices.  
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As total agri-food exports from Denmark only suffer small losses due to the assumed Brexit scenarios, 
simulation results from the current study also suggest that reductions in domestic production of key 
export products in Denmark would be quite small. For instance, for processed foods, pork, and dairy, 
outputs would be 2.5, 2.2, and 1.1 percent lower than their respectively baseline levels. In connections 
with changes in domestic outputs, sectoral reallocations of production factors such as labor and capital 
are also expected in the “medium run” horizon assumed in the model. As an indication of possible 
short run sectoral unemployment, the processed food, pork and dairy sectors’ employment of skilled 
and unskilled labor would shrink by 1-2.6 percent under the WTO scenario; under the FTA scenario, 
simulated negative employment effects are smaller for the three sectors, in the range of 0.2-1.5 
percent.  
At the macro level, nominal GDP for both Denmark and the UK are expected to decrease relative to 
the baseline; however, losses to Danish GDP are expected to be much smaller at about 0.64 percent 
under the WTO scenario and at 0.44 under the FTA scenario, as compared to 4.8 and 3.4 percent 
losses for the UK under the two scenarios respectively. Losses of real GDP are smaller for both 
Denmark and the UK, with the percentage losses for Denmark being smaller than that for the UK. 
These relative differences in GDP losses are indications of the asymmetric nature of the trade policy 
implications of Brexit: while the assumed increases in trade costs are the same for both the UK and 
EU, in effect the UK would have to face rising trade costs from all 27 remaining member states of 
the EU, a much larger export destination accounting for a large portion of its exports, as well as rising 
trade barriers from the EU’s FTA partner countries; for Denmark and other EU member states, rising 
trade costs only extend to the UK markets. Therefore, losses to GDP associated with reduced trade 
volumes would be understandably small for the remaining EU member states such as Denmark, not 
least because the EU single market and preferential accesses to the market of EU’s FTA partner 
countries provide ample flexibilities to redirect trade flows. 
Taken together, the results reported in this study are in line with the majority of existing studies 
regarding the harmful effects of Brexit to bilateral trade flows with the UK as well as the negative 
GDP effects for the UK and its trading partners within the EU. As an important destination market 
for Denmark, losing the UK as part of the EU single market would damage the export prospects of 
several key agri-food products originated from Denmark; however, such negative effects at the 
bilateral level can be partially avoided by redirecting trade within the EU market and with other 
countries. Following this logic and the numerical results, it is possible that further trade liberalization 
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either through the multilateral process or through the EU’s various bilateral initiatives aiming at 
further reducing trade barriers elsewhere will bring new trade opportunities for Danish products. With 
regard to the bilateral trade-relationship between Denmark and UK in the future, it is quite apparent 
that a WTO MFN relationship is not desirable for either side, and that an FTA between the UK and 
EU, while representing several steps back from status quo, would be much preferable to the WTO 
MFN option. 
Several caveats of the study also deserve some discussion. First, the simulation results are dictated 
by both the modeling structure and the assumptions regarding the Brexit scenarios including the 
magnitude of rising import tariffs and NTBs. In the latter case, uncertainties associated with the 
magnitude of estimated NTBs adopted from the limited current academic literature may be a cause 
of concern. Therefore, cautions need to be exercised when scrutinizing the simulation results resting 
on such assumptions. Second, out of the many possible Brexit scenarios, the current study – as in the 
case of a few other existing studies – only considers some indicative benchmarking scenarios (i.e. the 
WTO and FTA scenarios in the current study). The actual arrangements to be agreed by the UK and 
EU and possibly with third countries are of course not known at this time. Therefore, the presented 
results in the current study should not be treated as “predictions” and should only be understood 
within the specific assumptions and context of the two scenarios. Third, the scope of the current study 
is to model only the impacts of two alternative Brexit trade arrangement scenarios and the results are 
solely driven by the assumed changes in trade policies. Therefore, other considerations such as those 
surveyed in Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) are not taken into account. In relation to this point, for the 
agricultural sectors, a notable omission is about the implications of Brexit on the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU and how possible changes in the CAP due to Brexit may 
influence agri-food trade.  As a net contributor to the EU budget and the CAP budget, Matthews 
(2016) points out several channels through the Brexit can influence the CAP and agri-food trade, 
including future market orientations of the CAP, the size of the EU budget, regulatory environment 
in the EU, and EU’s trade relationship with third countries. A quantitative study by Boulanger and 
Philippidis (2015) finds that the UK can actually gain from withdrawal from the EU budget but 
administrative, procedural and trade facilitation costs due to exit from the EU’s single market would 
lead to overall welfare losses for the UK. Moreover, a full withdrawal from the EU would lead to 
welfare losses for both the EU and for Britain. It is however not clear from existing literature how the 
CAP dimension would impact Denmark. This therefore can be an interesting issue to investigate in a 
further study.  
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Appendix Table 1. Bilateral exports/imports of selected products from/to Denmark in 2011-2013 
 DK exports in mn DKK to 
 2011 2012 2013 
 UK EU World UK EU World UK EU World 
Processed Food     3,968        7,859      34,107      3,897        8,119      35,223      4,545        8,993      38,652  
BeverageTabacco        224        1,330        5,740         297        1,188        6,493         516        1,384        7,230  
Bovinemeats        181           527        5,105         121           530        5,040         122           616        5,075  
PorkPoultry     5,746        3,640      28,305      4,916        3,846      28,486      5,050        3,673      28,208  
OtherAnimalProd          39        1,197        9,036           83        1,351      10,659           43        1,248      11,920  
VegeOil          74        1,415        3,091         141        1,315        3,125           71        1,293        2,980  
MilkDairy     1,832        3,295      14,802      1,767        3,428      14,751      1,292        3,163      14,991  
All   53,878    123,631    520,206    52,825    124,664    527,205    46,811    123,084    528,735  
All AgriFood   12,709      22,554    114,599    12,152      22,990    117,685    12,948      23,538    123,577  
 DK imports in mn DKK from 
 2011 2012 2013 
 UK EU World UK EU World UK EU World 
Processed Food        995        5,023      26,036         869        5,253      26,690      1,299        5,952      28,325  
BeverageTabacco        551           940        6,880         586           914        6,591         860        1,222        7,522  
Bovinemeats        204           261        3,906         100           290        3,972         169           275        4,347  
PorkPoultry        207           699        6,501         181           704        7,836         206           730        7,650  
OtherAnimalProd          71        1,156        2,695           74           917        2,885           54        1,547        3,636  
VegeOil          58           442        6,347           32           581        7,427             7           630        8,191  
MilkDairy        152        1,061        4,368         150           968        3,750         142        1,060        4,645  
All   27,225    119,921    488,942    22,991    123,229    492,111    25,772    122,238    494,527  
All AgriFood     2,595      12,269      71,804      2,512      12,472      75,250      3,108      13,841      80,493  
Source: compiled from the GTAP database version 9. Trade data from the GTAP database are originally sourced from the UN 
COMTRADE database. Product classifications listed in column 1 are based on the GTAP classification (see www.gtap.org) Official annual 
exchange rates are used for converting the GTAP data in USD into DKK. 
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Appendix Table 2a. List of sectors  
 Aggregated sectors Disaggregated GTAP sectors included 
1 Pdr Paddy rice 
2 Wht Wheat 
3 Gro Cereal grains nec 
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
5 Osd Oil seeds 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 
7 Pfb Plant-based fibers 
8 Ocr Crops nec 
9 bovineanimal Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses 
10 Oap Animal products nec 
11 rawmilk Raw milk 
12 Wool Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
13 Extraction Forestry, Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals nec 
14 Fish Fishing 
15 bovinemeats Bovine meat products 
16 porkpoultry Meat products nec 
17 Vol Vegetable oils and fats 
18 milkdairy Dairy products 
19 Pcr Processed rice 
20 Sugar Sugar 
21 Ofd Food products nec 
22 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 
23 Textwapp Textiles, Wearing apparel 
24 LightMnfc Leather products, Wood products, Paper 
products, publishing, Metal products, Motor 
vehicles and parts, Transport equipment nec, 
Manufactures nec 
25 HeavyMnfc Petroleum, coal products, Chemical, rubber, 
plastic products, Mineral products nec, Ferrous 
metals, Metals nec, Electronic equipment, 
Machinery and equipment nec 
26 Util_Cons Electricity, Gas manufacture, distribution, 
Water, Construction 
27 TransComm Trade, Transport nec, Water transport, Air 
transport, Communication 
28 OthServices Financial services nec, Insurance, Business 
services nec, Recreational and other services, 
Public Administration (Defense, Education, 
Health), Dwellings 
Source: own aggregation of sectors in the GTAP database. 
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Appendix Table 2b. List of aggregated countries/regions  
Aggregation of region Countries/regions included 
Australia Australia 
NZL New Zealand 
RestofWorld Rest of Oceania 
China China, Hong Kong 
Japan Japan 
Korea South Korea 
RoEAsia Mongolia, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia 
SEAsia Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Rest of Southeast Asia 
IdnPhl Indonesia, Philippines 
Thailand Thailand 
Vietnam Vietnam 
RoSAsia Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Rest of 
South Asia 
India India 
Canada Canada 
USA USA 
Mexico Mexico 
RofNAme Rest of North America 
Argentina Argentina 
LatinAmer Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Rest of South 
America, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Rest of 
Central America, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 
Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean 
Brazil Brazil 
RofEU Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania 
Denmark Denmark 
France France 
Germany Germany 
Ireland Ireland 
Italy Italy 
Netherlands Netherlands 
Poland Poland 
Spain Spain 
UK Great Britain 
Switzerland Switzerland 
Norway Norway 
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RestofWorld Rest of EFTA, Albania, Belarus, Rest of Eastern 
Europe, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Rest of Former Soviet Union, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Rest of the 
World 
Russia Russia 
Ukraine Ukraine 
MENA Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Rest of Western Asia, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest 
of North Africa 
Turkey Turkey 
Egypt Egypt 
SSA Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote dIvoire, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Rest of 
Western Africa, Central Africa, South Central 
Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of Eastern 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Rest of South 
African Customs Union 
SAfrica South Africa 
Source: own aggregation of countries/regions in the GTAP database. 
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Appendix Table 3. Changes in bilateral pork exports from Denmark, from baseline levels  
% changes in bilateral exports  
 
changes in bilateral exports (mn USD)  
WTO 
(MFN 
only) 
WTO 
(MFN+NTB) 
FTA 
 
WTO 
(MFN 
only) 
WTO 
(MFN+NTB) 
FTA 
Australia 2.1 7.4 5.3 
 
-5.1 1.8 -0.9 
NZL 2.9 6 5.1 
 
-5.6 -5.4 -5.5 
China 1.7 7.8 4.8 
 
-0.2 15.0 7.5 
Japan 0.6 1.8 1 
 
3.0 50.6 13.8 
Korea 1.5 3.6 2.3 
 
-1.1 2.7 0.2 
RoEAsia 2.2 8.5 5.7 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vietnam 3.3 8 5.5 
 
0.1 0.4 0.3 
Thailand 0.4 3.8 1.3 
 
-0.1 0.3 0.0 
IdnPhl 3.5 8 5.7 
 
0.4 1.7 1.0 
SEAsia 0.4 7 3.3 
 
-0.2 1.3 0.4 
11 India 1.3 3.6 1.4 
 
0.0 0.1 0.0 
RoSAsia 2.6 6.1 3.2 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canada 1.8 8 5.3 
 
-0.1 0.3 0.1 
USA 1.8 7.6 5.1 
 
-8.2 -2.2 -4.8 
Mexico 2 8.1 5.6 
 
-0.1 0.2 0.1 
RofNAme 1.3 4.4 2.8 
 
-0.1 0.4 0.1 
Argentia 0.3 7.7 3.5 
 
0.1 0.8 0.4 
Brazil 2.8 6.4 3.8 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
LatinAmer 1.9 8.7 5.1 
 
0.0 1.3 0.6 
Denmark 3.1 3.9 2.9 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 2.4 3.3 2 
 
2.3 2.5 2.0 
Germany 2 3.4 1.9 
 
22.1 27.2 20.6 
Ireland 28 37.2 27.9 
 
7.5 9.8 7.4 
Italy 1.1 2.3 1.1 
 
2.3 3.6 2.0 
Netherlands 0.2 4.2 1.5 
 
0.0 0.5 0.2 
Poland 5.2 5.9 4.5 
 
15.1 15.9 12.0 
Spain 2 3.4 1.8 
 
0.8 1.0 0.7 
RofEU 1.3 1.4 0.6 
 
9.3 8.0 5.2 
UK -46.7 -94.3 -51 
 
-254.9 -523.5 -280.0 
Switzerland 1.2 4.9 2.6 
 
0.0 0.1 0.0 
Norway 1.6 4.2 2.4 
 
0.3 2.1 0.8 
Russia 1.3 6.2 3.8 
 
-0.6 8.3 3.9 
Ukraine 2 5.3 3.1 
 
0.1 0.2 0.1 
Turkey 1.2 6.2 3.6 
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egypt -0.6 6.7 2.6 
 
0.0 0.3 0.1 
MENA 0.6 6.6 3.4 
 
0.2 1.6 0.8 
SAfrica 5.2 11.3 7.9 
 
0.6 1.3 0.9 
SSA 1.4 6.3 3.6 
 
0.0 0.5 0.2 
RestofWorld 1.8 6.3 3.9 
 
0.0 2.1 0.9 
total -1.6 -2.7 -1.3 
 
-212.4 -369.7 -208.6 
Source: simulation results.   
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Appendix Table 4. Changes in total exports by exporting countries, % from baseline 
  WTO (MFN only) WTO (MFN+NTB) FTA 
Australia -0.07 -0.48 -0.34 
NZL -0.1 -0.06 -0.11 
China -0.06 -0.32 -0.23 
Japan -0.12 -0.64 -0.45 
Korea -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
RoEAsia 0 0.07 0.06 
Vietnam 0.08 0.05 0.09 
Thailand -0.06 0.08 0.09 
IdnPhl -0.08 -0.25 -0.19 
SEAsia 0.05 0.27 0.21 
India 0.05 0.29 0.25 
RoSAsia -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 
Canada -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 
USA -0.1 -0.5 -0.36 
Mexico -0.04 -0.19 -0.14 
RofNAme 0.08 0.34 0.28 
Argentia -0.11 -0.77 -0.46 
Brazil -0.08 -1.03 -0.61 
LatinAmer -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 
Denmark -0.06 -0.43 -0.29 
France -0.13 -0.57 -0.45 
Germany -0.07 -0.48 -0.36 
Ireland -0.44 -1.77 -1.26 
Italy -0.08 -0.49 -0.35 
Netherlands -0.09 -0.76 -0.56 
Poland -0.11 -0.5 -0.38 
Spain -0.07 -0.22 -0.19 
RofEU -0.03 -0.22 -0.16 
UK -3.12 -9.33 -7.23 
Switzerland 0.01 0.1 0.1 
Norway 0.02 0.14 0.1 
Russia -0.03 -0.2 -0.14 
Ukraine -0.03 0.01 0.03 
Turkey -0.01 0.14 0.13 
Egypt -0.11 -0.42 -0.3 
MENA 0 -0.02 -0.02 
SAfrica -0.37 -0.32 -0.32 
SSA 0.03 0.03 0.01 
RestofWorld 0.01 0 0 
Source: simulation results. Changes exceeding +/-0.25% are highlighted. 
